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Law is politics and often also policy. 
                                                             Boudewijn Bouckaert 
Prof. Em. University Ghent 
Academic lawyers like to speak with some disdain about politicians. Often 
politicians rose from their ranks. In this case the disdain is even higher. The 
academic lawyer, transformed into a politician is then considered as a kind of 
fallen angel. Somebody who abandoned the pure and integer heaven of the law 
for the intrigues and the filthy deals of the political hell. Nevertheless, both 
professional groups enjoy little confidence among the population. A poll of the 
Leuven Institute of Social and Political Opinion Research points out that the 
confidence of the population in the justice system as in the political parties as 
well is rather low.
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Justice 
System 
10,9% 35,3 % 31,1% 21,1 % 1,5 % 
Political 
Parties 
10,2 % 39,0 % 42,1 % 8,7 % 0,0 % 
 
Both justice system and the political parties are polling in this survey less well 
than the police, the unions, the monarchy and the banks. Only the result of the 
church is worse. 
In this article we will show that, notwithstanding the uneasy relationship 
between both professional groups, lawyers and politicians, their fields of 
activity are strongly intertwined. Probably more than lawyers are willing to 
admit.  
Of course, the question about the relationship between politics and law is very 
broad ranged. It is a container question from which a varied plurality of sub 
                                                          
1
 Bart Meuleman, Koen Abts and Marc Swyngedouw, ‘ De Wantrouwige Vlaming. De 
toestand van het institutionele vertrouwen in Vlaanderen’, Instituut voor Sociaal en Politiek 
Opinieonderzoek’ (ISPO), ISPO/2012-2 
 
 
2 
questions can be distilled. To limit the scope of our article we will 
consequently focus on three, more delineated positions:  
(1) Law is politics, but law can acquire a real and  stable autonomy 
towards government policy 
(2) Courts often supplement government policy, even  in very vital 
questions 
(3) Policy considerations are slipping increasingly into court decisions.  
In these positions the notions politics and policy are crucial. It is important to 
stress the difference between them.  
In the line of Aristotle
2
, we understand politics as the art of living together in 
wider social contexts. Social contexts which surpass the household 
(the’oikos’), the village and the tribe. In this wide sense politics encompass as 
well the reciprocal  rights and duties of the members of society, as the scope, 
the functions and  the government of collective institutions and finally also the 
question about the recruitment of the elites, responsible for legislation, 
administration and  justice provision.  
The notion of policy is much narrower.  This notion refers to a line of 
governance pursued by an institution. Policies are not only common to public 
institutions. Also private institutions and NGO’s most often develop their 
policies. 
Within the same intellectual area a third notion, i.e. a polity, can be mentioned. 
This notion refers to the political entity within which politics and policies are 
developed. This polity can be a city state, a nation state, a dynastic state, a 
world state ( ‘kosmopolis’), a federal state, a member state of a federation or 
confederacy, a religious community (for instance the Islamic ‘Umma’). Many 
political ideologies and conflicts concern the question about the optimal polity 
in which politics and policies should be developed (the nation, a people, a 
race, a religious community, the world…). Belgium for instance is an area of 
conflict concerning the quest for the optimal ‘polity’ or ‘polities’ (Belgium, 
Flanders, Wallonia, Brussels ….). This quest generates many complications in 
Belgian politics. The problem of the optimal polity however, will not be 
discussed in this contribution.  
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1. The autonomy of law towards government policy 
The impression of autonomy of the legal world towards the world of politics is 
a legacy of the nineteenth century, an era during which the legal world had 
indeed a real and stable autonomy towards government policy. This autonomy 
was much more limited before this century and declined after it, especially 
after the First World War.  
Before the nineteenth century, the period of the so called Ancien Regime, a 
plurality of political authorities was involved in the process of legal 
rulemaking. Rulemaking was not the sole privilege of the sovereign princes, 
enacting multiple decrees and ordinances, but also lower ranked land lords, 
city authorities, city guilds and church authorities in canon law intervened in 
the process of rulemaking. This resulted into a complicated legal landscape of 
legislation, customs, case law, privileges, regulations, etc. To promote some 
order in these legal jungles academic lawyers on the European continent 
developed general legal traditions such as Roman law and natural law (‘droit 
naturel’, ‘Vernunftrecht’). These general legal traditions constituted the 
subject of study in the law faculties of the Ancien Regime Universities. They 
also served as default rules or as guidelines of statutory interpretation (‘ratio 
scripta’).  Some well inspired and well advised monarchs, the so called 
enlightened despots, had understood already before the French Revolution that 
these complicated legal landscapes and the steady intervention of big and 
small legislators impaired economic growth. Consequently, they took the 
already developed general legal traditions as guideline for the elaboration of 
general and uniform legal codes.  To mention some famous examples: empress 
Maria-Theresia and the ‘Codex Theresianus’, the Prussian king Frederick the 
Great and the ‘Allgemeines Landrecht’. 3 The typical nineteenth century 
relationship between law and politics was however established in France 
through the famous French Revolution. The revolutionary elites, who were 
pressed for moderation in their reforms by Napoleon, were able to establish a 
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legislative body, i.e. the Code Civil, which was on one hand based on 
revolutionary principles of natural law, such as freedom of contract and 
private property, but relied on the other hand, in its more concrete rules, on the 
pre-revolutionary French legal tradition.  By this clever combination of 
revolution and conservatism, of rupture and continuity, the new regime was 
able to gain a lot of legitimacy across broad layers of the French population. 
4
 
This legislative body, the real masterpiece of Napoleon, would constitute 
during more than hundred years the institutional base of an explicit autonomy 
of the legal world towards the political one.  The contrast between the political 
inertia concerning private law legislation and the political turbulence 
concerning the constitution is a clear illustration of this autonomy. Nineteenth 
century France faced two heavy war periods (Napoleonic wars, the Franco-
German war of 1870-71), one limited civil war (the Paris Commune), three 
revolutions and nine constitutional regimes! As far as private law is concerned 
nineteenth century France shows us the Arcadic image of a quiet streaming 
river.  French private law evolved through a triangular interaction between the 
law professors at their faculties, the judges in their Palaces and legal practice, 
especially the contractual one, on the field. In the beginning of the century 
academic scholars and courts stayed closely with the text of the code (‘The 
Exegetic School’), but gradually, through the necessities on the field, but also 
by changed opinions, more distance was taken from the text of the code and 
civil law became more and more conceived as a system of principles and 
concepts, as ‘un système de droit civil’.  Not the literal meaning of the text, 
but ‘le système’ constituted the base of civil law. The legal texts had to be read 
and interpreted in function of ‘le système’. Conceiving the civil law as a 
system of concepts and principles was however already earlier and more 
outspokenly the case in the German countries. Aubry and Rau, two professors 
in Staatsburg and the most prominent advocates of this systemic view on the 
civil law, elaborated this view in a magnificent way in their manual ‘Cours de 
Droit Civil’. 5 
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The stronger emphasis on ‘Das System’ in Germany, rather than on legislative 
texts, is not a coincidence. Until 1870 Germany was politically highly divided. 
Some German countries had a private law Codification, like Prussia and 
Bavaria, other countries did not. Lacking a political power for legal 
unification, as was Napoleon in France, this mission was taken up by the 
German law professors.  Building on the older general legal traditions of 
natural law and Roman law, the German professors elaborated an impressive 
system of legal principles and concepts. This system had the pretention of 
coherence and completeness. New social evolutions could be integrated into 
the system by further sophistication of it. Rudolf von  Jhering, a legal scholar 
of the later nineteenth century, ridiculed this theory by calling it 
‘Begriffsjuriprudenz’ and ‘Juristische Begriffshimmel’.6 The emphasis on 
jurisprudence as the engine of legal unification in nineteenth Germany may 
sound paradoxical, taking into account the dominance of the so called 
Historical School. This school is famous for its resistance against codification 
‘ à la Française’ (Friedrich von Savigny) and its interest in the study of older 
customary law (for instance by the brothers Grimm). One should however not 
neglect that the most prominent representatives of this Historical School, the 
so called Romanists (as opposed to the Germanists), considered the law based 
on customs as fit only for primitive societies. For developed and complex 
societies the customary law was not adequate. Consequently, there was a need 
for a more sophisticated ‘customary’ law, and this had to be provided by 
jurisprudence.  Moreover, the resistance against Codification was not absolute. 
According to von Savigny the Germany of the first half of the nineteenth 
century was not ready for Codification.  One had to wait until the most 
creative forces of the law, especially jurisprudence, had elaborated the law in a 
way it which was adequate for a modern society. 
7
 Generally spoken, the 
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Romanist lawyers of the Historical School made their way. The Bürgerliches 
Gesetzbuch, enacted  in 1899, after long and subtle discussions in numerous 
erudite commissions, reflected  largely the system approach of the former 
generations of Romanist lawyers. 
The autonomy of the legal world vis à vis the political one applies certainly 
also to nineteenth century England.  The institutional base for this autonomy 
was however different. In France this base was provided by an encompassing 
and stable codification. In Germany by a system of principles and concepts 
elaborated by jurisprudence. In England the shield against reiterated political 
intervention was provided by the prestigious common law based on 
elaboration ‘from precedent to precedent’. In difference with France and 
Germany, the distinction between the world of the law and the world of 
politics was also reflected by the used legal source.  The law was developed by 
case law, from precedent to precedent.  Political intervention at the contrary 
through statutes voted by the Parliament.  If politics wanted to meddle with the 
law, it had to do it through a statute, which could be considered as a foreign 
element, pushed into the organically grown body of the common law. The 
difference of legal sources resulted in an additional political threshold, which 
was absent in France and Germany. At least formally, the Code Civil and the 
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch were voted as laws by the Parliament, by which they 
were ranked hierarchically at the same level as the laws through which 
political intervention had to occur.  
England however remained not totally free from Codification attempts. 
Political radicals such as Jeremy Bentham and Henry Peter Brougham 
advocated a codification ‘à la Française’ because they considered the 
‘common law’ as antiquated and as a source of legal uncertainty. 8 Their 
action remained not without result although these results stayed far below the 
expectations of the mentioned reformers. Some parts of the common law were 
submitted to legislative reform, such as for instance procedural law through 
the Judicature Acts of 1878. The main body of private law stayed however out 
of the hands of the statute law and remained the playing field of case law. 
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Notwithstanding significant differences, the three most prominent legal 
cultures  of Europe show one crucial common trait: the world of law 
(especially private law) evolved according to its own logic, which was 
relatively autonomous towards the world of politics. The political world 
(parliaments, governments, political parties) were concerned with foreign and 
colonial policies, with the building of collective infra-structure such as roads, 
railroads and ports, (sometimes) with education, with tax collection, with the 
administrative structure. The lawyers were concerned with family and 
patrimony, with property, with contracts, with torts, with corporations, etc. It 
is true that the historical scenarios of the three countries show important 
differences. In France the first move was made by the legislator and the law 
professors and judges built further on this. In Germany the ‘learned’ lawyers 
of the numerous and prestigious universities were the prominent forces in legal 
development and their sophisticated theories were largely integrated into the 
codification at the end of the century. In England private law remained the 
playing field of the courts, who developed the law through casuistic analogies 
(a similibus ad similia), supported only in a supplementary way by some 
limited legislative interventions.  
This autonomy of the legal world towards government policy is however not 
something as a law of nature, but relied on a consensus among the political 
elites in the beginning of the nineteenth century.  Under the influence of  the 
preceding  intellectual and social economic evolution (the Enlightenment, 
scientific and technological innovation, the failure of mercantilism,  the 
erosion of feudalism) the elites became convinced that a permanent  and 
regular intervention of governments into the relationships between  
individuals, now called ‘citizens’, had to lead  to stagnation, exploitation  and 
social frictions.  As a consequence, to submit the whole area of daily life and 
the economy to the free interaction between citizens, companies and 
associations, was considered as the best solution. Free interaction however 
coordinated according the specific rules of the game, articulated in the private 
law. For this attitude a somewhat misleading term has been introduced, i.e. 
‘laissez-fairisme’, literally to be translated as ‘let them do what they want’. 
This is not what the nineteenth century elites had in mind.  The agents of 
social life had to conform their actions to specific rules such as respecting 
property rights, respecting contractual arrangements, compensation for 
inflicted harm.  Also the related term ‘night watchman state’ is misleading. 
 
 
8 
This term suggests that the government should be concerned exclusively with 
police tasks. The elites had a much wider scope of government in mind. The 
government was concerned with the whole of society but considered its task as 
an ‘ordering’ one, i.e. through the enforcement of the general rules of private 
law, and not as a ‘steering’ one through concrete and situational interventions. 
Especially on the European continent this ‘new order’ had a dramatic impact 
on the pre-revolutionary structure of social relationships. Land lords were no 
more able to submit the farmers to irritant restrictions (for instance concerning 
gaming)
9
, guilds and corporations lost their regulatory powers, the church lost 
its jurisdiction in family matters, toll ways and toll waterways were abolished, 
privileged trade and industrial companies lost their monopoly, etc.  This was 
less the case in England because some of similar reforms were already 
introduced earlier through the evolution of the common law.   
Arrunada and Andanova consider this difference even as the most important 
explanation for the codification in France and the absence of it in England.  In 
order to introduce free market principles in France the judiciary needed to be 
disciplined by the framework of a Code for the judiciary remained deeply 
imbued by a pre-revolutionary feudal mentality
10
. Giving free reign to this 
judiciary would have led, according to the revolutionary elites, to a swift re-
introduction of pre-revolutionary relationships. In England such a disciplining 
framework for the judiciary was not necessary. At the contrary, the judges of 
the common law had already developed before several free market principles 
by which they had tied down the hands of the king and his government. This 
explanation, provided by Arrunada and Andanova, finds some support in the 
historical situation of France and England in the beginning of the nineteenth 
century. It can however hardly be considered as a mono-causal explanation.  
Van den Berg for instance shows quite convincingly that also the urge for 
legal uniformity, which was felt as a necessity for a modern nation state, was a 
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crucial factor. 
11
 England however was already since the Middle Ages a well 
organised unitary state, in which a common law was applied. Consequently 
there was no need of a codification in order to have a uniform legal system. 
Pre-revolutionary France at the contrary was a patch work of regional 
‘coûtumes’, applied by sclerotic courts ( ‘les  Parlements’), resisting 
permanently all attempts of reforms in order to maintain their privileges. The 
big sweep of the Codification was consequently inevitable. 
The decision to submit daily life and economic interaction to an ordering 
system of abstract and stable rules, and not to concrete and situational policy 
interventions, is however also a political decision.  By such a decision the 
political class decides to interventionist abstention. The political class decides 
here to refrain from government policy in large domains of social life but to 
leave this to the policies of individuals, families, companies and voluntary 
associations. This however within the framework of individual rights and 
duties.  This decision on the macro-level, which is historically not identifiable 
in one single moment but is the result of a chain of smaller decisions, has to be 
considered as ‘politics’ of the highest level. It touches the deep structure of the 
‘polis’. The political character of it is shown a fortiori, first by the fact that this 
macro-political decision changed deeply pre-revolutionary social relationships, 
and second, by the fact that this macro-political decision was gradually turned 
back after the First World War through a macro-political trend of 
interventionist policies. 
2. Courts are involved in policy, even about crucial issues. 
According to the classical theory of the separation of powers courts should not 
decide about government policy. Of course, the judiciary is quite instrumental 
in government policies by enforcing the rules, devolving from government 
policies. Suppose that the judiciary would go on strike and abstain from 
enforcing the rules, government policies would remain dead letter. 
Nevertheless, the content of policies, as the classical theory goes, remains the 
full prerogative of the political powers (legislative and executive).  
This classical theory is however less and less evident.  Due to the complexity 
of government policies on different levels, the risk of contradictions and gaps 
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in the legislation has increased a lot. This triggers an implicit appeal to the 
judiciary to supplement these gaps and eliminate eventual contradictions. 
Beside his classical task of applying and enforcing policies judges are also 
supposed to complete the policies of the government. 
The so called stand still-principle concerning the application of social-
economic rights constitutes a clear illustration of this task of completing 
policy. In general it is accepted that these social –economic rights, provided by 
article 23 Belgian Constitution, do not entail subjective rights, enforceable 
before courts. 
12
 These rights are in the first place a guideline for government 
policies. It is up to the legislator and the government to translate these general 
rights into enforceable rules. Nevertheless jurisprudence and also some treaty 
provisions go a step further by advancing the stand still principle.
13
 When 
social-economic rights are provided in the constitution or in a treaty, the 
government is not allowed to pursue a policy resulting in the decrease of the 
existing level of social protection, provided by these rights. From a policy 
point of view the level of social protection, endorsed by these rights can only 
be increased or maintained, never decreased.  The Belgian Constitutional 
Court had to decide on this stand still principle at the occasion of an appeal 
against the increase of student fees at the universities of the French 
Community. 
14
The claimant, a student organisation, invoked in this case the 
Treaty on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966, since 1983 
incorporated into Belgian law. This treaty provides for a stand still principle 
concerning the right of costless education. The Court rendered in this case a 
Salomon’s’ verdict. The increase of the fees was considered not to be in 
contradiction with the treaty because the increase was too trivial to have a 
serious impact on the purchase power and average income of the students, 
spent on education.  By applying the stand still principle the judge clearly 
affect policies.  The stand still principle is in most cases relevant when the 
government has to cut expenses for budgetary reasons. By invoking the stand 
still principle the judge protects some social categories against cuts in 
expenses (allocations, subsidies) or against higher retributions (for instance 
fees, tickets in public transportation).  The impact of  such decisions will 
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however be that the burden of the budgetary cuts will have to be bore by other 
social categories, not or less protected by such social-economic rights. By 
applying the stand still principle the judge implicitly acts as a minister of the 
budget by shifting social burdens from one protected social category to non-
protected ones. 
The task of the judge in completing the legislative framework is even more 
prominent in the evolution of European case law.  
As the European Union is a treaty organisation, all power of EU-authorities 
should derive directly or indirectly from the treaties. The member-states of the 
EU are pooling parts of their sovereign power as a nation state towards the 
EU-institutions. Every legal act, legislative, executive or judicial, should find 
its legitimacy in the EU-treaties. Some scrutiny of the case law of the 
European Court of Justice points however out that this court has quasi proprio 
motu and without any support in the treaties, extended the competences of EU-
institutions. From the perspective of more European integration the result of 
such an extension may be perhaps defendable. The question however is 
whether such an extension had to be pushed through by the European Court 
and not by an explicit change of the treaties.  Now the impression prevails that 
the Court acted like baron von Munchhausen pulling himself on his hairs out 
of the marsh. The competence extension through court decisions can be 
illustrated by analysing some landmark cases of the European Court of Justice. 
- Van  Gend and  Loos 196315: article 12 of the EEC-treaty , in effect 
since 1 January 1958, provided that member)states were no more 
allowed neither to impose new import- or export-taxes nor 
increasing existing ones.  In a Protocol of the Benelux-countries of 
25 July 1958 a custom of 3 % ad valorem had been increased to 8 
%.  Based on article 12, the claimant appealed against this increase 
at the Nederlandse Tariefcommissie, which directed a prejudicial 
question to the European Court. According to the opinion of the 
advocate-general in this case article 12 had no direct effect but only 
resulted in an obligation of the member states.  By assigning direct 
effect to this article the impact of  article 12 would result in a very 
unequal application within the different member state for some 
member states had  accepted in their constitution  the superiority of  
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European law but others not. The Court did not listen to this advice 
and stated that the direct effect of this treaty provision resulted 
from the general philosophy of the EU and that the EU had 
established for some well-defined competences a new international 
legal order, limiting the sovereignty of the member states. 
 
- Internationale Handelsgesellschaft 197016: in this case the Court 
had to decide whether the legal validity of decisions, made by 
European Courts, could be questioned on the base of the rights and 
liberties provided by the Constitutions of the member-states. Also 
here there was nothing to doubt about for the Court.  If European 
decisions could be checked with constitutions of member states, 
this would lead to a very unequal application of European rules.  
Moreover, according to the Court, the respect for human rights and 
liberties is in line with the principles, endorsed by the Court itself. 
Protection of these rights and liberties had to be sought within the 
framework and the aims of the European Community. 
 
- Van Duyn v Home office 197417: Ms. Van Duyn applied for a 
position within the Church of Scientology in England. The Home 
Office however denied her access to the country because of the 
notorious reputation of this church.  Ms. Van Duyn appealed to the 
High Court, which directed a prejudicial question to the European 
Court of Justice. The claimant invoked  article 48 of the EEC-treaty 
(free mobility of labour) and on Directive 64/221, which implied 
that national regulations limiting the access of the national territory 
for reasons of public policy and safety could only take the personal 
behaviour of the person as a criterion. According to Ms. Van Duyn 
her denial of access was not based on her personal behaviour but on 
the pretended characteristics of the institution, she intended to work 
for.  Legally the question was raised whether the mentioned 
Directive had direct effect within the English legal order or not 
because the Directive was not explicitly integrated within this 
order. The Home Office invoked article 189 EEC-Treaty in which a 
distinction was made between  Regulations and Directives and in 
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which direct effect was assigned to Regulations.  By reasoning a 
contrario, no direct effect should be assigned to Directives. If the 
European Council had indeed the intention to assign direct effect 
also to Directives, it would have mentioned it explicitly. The Court 
however did not accept this argument. By denying direct effect to 
Directives the legal authority of Directives would be undermined. 
Moreover, by denying a direct effect to Directives, also the benefits 
of the Directives would be denied towards the European citizens.  
 
- Parti Ecologiste ‘Les Verts’ v European Parliament 198318. The 
French Green Party felt being treated unfairly by the allocation of 
funds, awarded to the political parties for their electoral 
campaigning.  The European Parliament had abused  its right by 
privileging the incumbent parties at the detriment of the new 
comers. The question arose whether the European Court had 
jurisdiction on the decision of the Parliament. Article 173 of the 
EEC-Treaty provides that the Court decides about the legal validity 
of the decisions of the European Council and the European 
Commission. The Parliament is however not mentioned. The Court 
did not worry about this restriction.  Deciding  the non-competence 
of the Court on measures of the European Parliament would be in 
contradiction with the philosophy of the European Treaty. 
 
The analysed decisions of the European Court of Justice illustrate quite clearly 
that the Court does not limit itself to the mere application of Treaty provisions, 
Regulations and Directives. The Court is also productive in the further 
elaboration of the European Institutions, including its own competence, 
eventually at the expense of the competences of the member states. To put it 
shortly, the Court practices self-extension.  This self-extension does not 
concern marginal details of legal trivialities. The question about the direct 
effect of treaty provisions, regulations and directives affects the core of the 
political-legal relationship between the European Union and the member 
states.  In case of direct effect the member state loses a part of  control on its 
own institutions. In case of direct effect the national political authorities have 
to accept that their own judiciary has to apply rules, which were not developed 
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and enacted by themselves. It is as if a new master intrudes the national home 
and takes control over a part of the employed  staff of it. Again, one can be in 
favour of the result of this process of self-extension, i.e. an ever stronger union 
and the establishment of a robust and uniform European legal order.  One can 
however also raise questions about the method through which this result was 
realized. Self-extension does not create much of legitimacy.  A more explicit 
discussion about this between the member states had probably slowed down 
the process of European integration, but  had also given more legitimacy  to 
the European integration process and less fuel to Euro scepticism. 
 
3. Limiting policy or determining policy? The distinction is 
weakening. 
The relationship between the judges and government policy is of course the 
most delicate for those jurisdictions which have to decide on the legal validity 
of measures, devolving from government policy such as administrative courts 
(p.ex. the Council of State in Belgium), constitutional courts (p. ex. the 
Constitutional Court in Belgium) and international courts (p.ex. the European 
Court of Justice, the European Court of Human Rights).  By their decisions 
these instances can stop a certain policy to be pursued and force the 
government to look for alternatives. Nobody will deny the sometimes dramatic 
impact of the decisions of these instances on government policy. Nevertheless, 
according to the classical theory, this impact should not mean that judges 
determine policy.  The position of these judicial instances would reflect the 
image of rather a ‘delineator’ of policy than a ‘decision maker’ in it. 
According to the classical theory legitimate democratic majorities enjoy a 
freedom in determining their policies, but these majorities are tied to legal 
boundaries such as constitutional rules, treaty provisions and general 
principles of law. It is up to the mentioned judicial instances to guard these 
boundaries. 
This classical theory remains for a large part relevant.  Many decisions of 
these judicial instances can be considered rather as limiting policy than as 
determining policy. 
To mention some examples:  
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- The government can pursue an anti-racism-policy but has to respect 
in this the constitutional limitation of the freedom of speech. As a 
consequence, this anti-racism-policy cannot entail an ‘opinion 
policy’. The sharpness of this limitation is not the same in all legal 
systems. In the US the limitation is very sharp because of the First 
Amendment of the Constitution.
19
In Belgium this limitation is not 
so strict because of the laws against holocaust denial and racism.
20
 
 
- The government can pursue a policy concerning gaming, but has to 
respect in this individual freedom such as the freedom to abstain 
from membership of an association.  The law Verdeille in France 
made it possible that municipalities could establish an ACCA 
(‘Association Communale de Chasse Aggréee’). The owners of 
land could then be obliged to become a member of this association 
and open their land to game migration and giving access to gaming. 
The European Court of Human Rights considered this mandatory 
membership of an ACCA as a disproportionate limitation of 
individual freedom and property rights.
21
 
Often however the distinction between a ‘delineator’ of policy and a decision 
maker in it is not so clear and in some cases the judge is drawn deeply into real 
policy issues.  
This happens in the first place through the impact of the ex ante policy 
preparatory works on the ex post legal validity control.  During the last three 
decennia governments spend more and more attention to cost-benefit-balances 
in their policy.  Specialised government departments, mostly directly 
supervised by central government authorities (p.ex. the president, the prime 
minister), check proposed regulations on their expected costs and benefits and 
compare the proposed regulations with possible, less interventionist 
alternatives ((p.ex. provision of information, self-regulation by the sector, 
                                                          
19
 This is shown in National Socialist Party of America v Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 4 
(1977) The Supreme Court ruled that a march of the national socialists through a quarter 
with a Jewish majority could not be banned because of the First Amendment. 
20
 The law against holocaust denial (29 march 1995) incriminates opinions, in which the 
holocaust is either denied or minimalized. The law against racism (30 July 1981, amended 
several times) incriminates opinions, involving a systematic instigation of hatred against 
ethnic groups or of discrimination. 
21
 Chassagnou and Others v France, ECHR, 29 April1999, 25088/94, 28331/95 and 28443/95 
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covenants with the government, policy taxes, etc.).
22
 As the classical 
viewpoint goes such cost-benefit-analyses belong to the mere preparatory 
phase of rulemaking and have as such no impact on the ex post legal validity 
control by the judge. Nevertheless, gradually preparatory works start to have 
an impact on ex post legal validity control.  
This is clearly the case for European case law.  The White Paper of the 
Mandelkern group was the official start-up of regulation management within 
the European Union.  The White Paper provided that for all decisive acts 
within the European Union such as Regulations, Directives, White and Green 
Papers a preceding Impact Assessment has to be elaborated. Within the terms 
of art. 288 TFEU these Impact Assessments and their Guidelines are no more 
than ‘atypical’ acts without any legal binding impact.  
Nevertheless the European Court seems to abandon this position by adopting a 
so called ‘process-oriented review’23 . In this review the control of the legal 
validity of an act is not limited to the final regulatory act, but concerns also the 
process of its legal genesis. Through this, ‘atypical acts’ from the preparatory 
phase of the act can become relevant for the ex post legal validity control. The 
famous legal dictum Patere Legem Quam Ipse Fecisti provides the deeper 
normative bases for such a process-oriented approach. Indeed, when the EU-
policy makers impose to themselves a certain procedure for the making of an 
act, such as the drafting of an Impact Assessment, and when these policy 
makers fail to follow their own procedure, they cripple at the same time the 
legal validity of the final act.  The judicial involvement into policy 
considerations also follows from the proportionality principle, provided by art. 
5.1 TFEU. The process- oriented review urges the judge to scrutinize the 
correctness of the preparatory process of an act and in this scrutiny the judge 
will have to consider the Impact Assessment from which she can eventually 
conclude that the act does not meet the requirement of proportionality. The 
European Court followed this approach in Spain v Council 
24
, stating that the 
European Council, however sovereign within its policy margin, is required 
nevertheless to prove that it has made a careful inquiry about all relevant 
                                                          
22
 For an exhaustive overview of the development of regulation management see A. Renda, 
Law and Economics in the RIA-world, Ph.D. Dissertation, Erasmus University Rotterdam, 2011 
23
 On the ‘proess-oriented review’ see K. Lenaerts, ‘ The European Court of Justice and 
Process-oriented Review’, Department of European Legal Studies, Research Paper, 01/2012 
24
 Case C-310/04 Spain v Council (2006) ECR I-7285 
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factors concerning the situation , which is the subject of the regulation. The 
Court is even more explicit in Sungro SA
25
et al by  stating that the regulation 
in itself is not disproportional  but that by not considering all relevant factors 
of the situation and especially the lack of an Impact Assessment  the act does 
not meet the requirement of proportionality. In the case Vodafone
26
the 
advocate-general as the court as well refer to the Impact Assessment to 
ascertain that alternative options for the roaming regulation were analysed and 
that consequently the regulation cannot be considered as disproportional.  
When this tendency is continued within European case law Impact 
Assessments will become always more important in the proportionality 
assessments of EU policy decisions. As a consequence EU judges will spend 
more attention to the know- how of Impact Assessments in order to draw from 
them the correct conclusions. This will lead in the longer run to a more active 
policy involvement of judges. They will not only guard the limits of policy 
margins but they will also be participating in policy by checking the 
proportionality on the base of the preparatory works such as cost-benefit-
analysis. 
Policy assessment based on the proportionality check becomes also more and 
more relevant in the case law of the Belgian Constitutional Court. This is 
illustrated by the case on the Flemish Grond- en Pandendecreet (Decree on 
Landed Property Management). By this Decree the Flemish government 
imposed on the land sub dividers, involved in a subdivision of more than then 
lots, to sell to the government two lots at prices, fixed by the government.  
These lots had to be used to provide for social housing. As compensation the 
sub dividers could enjoy a reduction of VAT. The sub dividers went to the 
Constitutional Court invoking the disproportional violation of property rights 
within this Decree. In order to check this claim the Belgian Constitutional 
Court referred to the European Court for a prejudicial question whether this 
VAT-reduction could be considered as a hidden non-registered subsidy to sub 
dividers; The European Court answered this question. positively 
27
 Because 
the compensation through the VAT-reduction had to be annulled the 
Constitutional Court had no alternative than to decide that the obligation of the 
sub dividers to sell two lots at fixed prices was a disproportional violation of 
                                                          
25
 Cases T-252/07 and T-272/07(2010) ECR II-55 
26
 Case C-58/08 Vodafone and Others (2010) 
27
 Cases C-197/11 and C-203/11 
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property rights and to annul this provision of the mentioned Flemish decree.
28
 
The answer of the European Court on the prejudicial question by the Belgian 
Constitutional Court offered this court a nice escape not to render a substantial 
judgment on the Flemish decree.  By the annulment of the VAT-reduction the 
internal compensation, provided in the Decree, had disappeared by which the 
disproportionality had become evident in the terms of the Decree itself. 
Suppose that no compensation through VAT-reduction had been provided 
within the Decree, the Constitutional Court had to decide whether the hidden 
taking to the sub dividers was disproportionate or not and whether alternatives 
were not better suited. Even when in this case the substantial proportionality 
test could be avoided, inevitably the Constitutional Court will be confronted 
with legal questions in which the proportionality test is crucial and in which 
the cost-benefit -analysis made in the preparatory phase will be decisive. By 
this the borderline between the function of the judge as ‘delineator’ of policy 
and a decision maker in policy will become more and more porous. 
 
4. Conclusion 
When we understand by politics the art of living together in wider social 
context, it is impossible to separate law from politics. At the contrary, law is a 
full part of politics. This is also the case when the ‘world of the law’ has 
realized a relative autonomy towards policy, when the law becomes more or 
less ‘policy-proof’.  Indeed, also the ‘policy-proof’-character of the law is the 
result of a political decision, albeit one of the highest macro-political level. In 
this case the political world decides not to submit large parts of social live to 
concrete and iterated policy interventions but to submit it to stable, general and 
abstract rules and principles. The political-legal culture of the European 
nineteenth century is a clear illustration of this.  
In the beginning of the former century this ‘policy-proof’ character of the law 
have been abandoned to a large extent by which legal rulemaking has acquired 
more and more a policy character. This evolution has also its impact on the 
position of the judge.  
                                                          
28
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In the first place judges have been, without been willing it, placed in a position 
of policy supplementation because more and more hiatus and contradictions 
become apparent in the complex and sometimes ephemeral government 
policies.  
The highest judicial instances, which have the competences to decide about 
the legal validity of legislative and administrative policy measures, are eager 
to define their position rather as a policy delineator than as a decision maker in 
policy. In this way they try to avoid a too active involvement into policy 
questions. The role of a policy delineator implies that the judge checks policy 
measures on higher norms (constitutional, treaties) which are supposed to be 
‘policy proof’ also. Often the judges leave in fact this role of policy delineator 
and see themselves involved into the content of policies. Because the quantity 
and quality of  regulations has an always rising impact on the economic 
attractiveness of a country in a globalized world, governments are more and 
more eager to check their regulations on their economic necessity (cost-
benefit-analysis).  When courts have to decide on the proportionality of 
regulations, one can expect that these courts will consult the preparatory 
assessments, in which the economic viability of these regulations was 
scrutinized. When the interventions within the economy through regulations 
and policies increase, it is to be expected that the economic agents retaliate in 
some way and demand that these regulations reflect the requirements of 
economic efficiency. It will be expected from judges that they take up their 
role in these efficiency checks. 
The reciprocal intertwinement of law, policy and economy, we analysed in the 
preceding sections show that law is not an isolated social phenomenon.  The 
law is an integral part of politics in its large sense.  This implies that it is 
impossible to practice legal science in the way it was when law was ‘policy 
proof’ for a large part. To assess law as a kind of an auto-referential system, as 
an ‘autopoeisis’, to use the expression of Niclas Luhmann29, has become a real 
anachronism. 
‘Politics, I conceive is to be nothing more than the science of the ordered 
progress of society along the lines of greatest usefulness and convenience to 
itself’ With these words Woodrow Wilson also identified the deeper aim  of 
the law in society, i.e. as a tool of ordered progress.  
                                                          
29
 See Niclas Luhmann, Legitimation durch Verfahren, Berlin, 1969 
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